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T he 10-year anniversary of the arrival of US troops in Afghanistan in October 2001 has focused international atten-
tion on the prospects for stability in the coun-
try following the scheduled withdrawal of US 
and NATO forces by 2014. This timetable in-
vites comparisons with the Soviet occupation 
(1979-1989) and subsequent withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, after which the country entered 
a prolonged political crisis and civil conflict. 
While there are major differences between 
the US and Soviet experiences, and the post-
withdrawal prospects of both, there is a high 
risk that, as in 1989, the withdrawal of foreign 
forces could see an upsurge in insurgent at-
tacks and a steady deterioration towards major 
civil conflict. 
In the context of Afghanistan’s modern his-
tory, two occupying forces have attempted to 
solidify control and bolster feeble regimes – 
the Soviet Union and the US-NATO alliance, 
which remains ongoing. Afghanistan’s severe 
social, political and economic upheavals since 
1973 have had a formative impact on nearly 
two generations of Afghans and left a damag-
ing scar on society and its government institu-
tions. The United States has endured a com-
mitment to stabilising Afghanistan longer than 
the  Soviet experience but, with increasingly 
little time to act, the US is pursuing several 
contentious strategies that bear the hallmarks 
of floundering Soviet approaches attempted 20 
years earlier. 
As the US effort in Afghanistan enters its 
final stage, shifting strategies such as military 
efforts that focus on key population centres, 
reconciliation and reintegration of insurgents, 
creating local defence and militia units to de-
fend the countryside, and the ‘Afghanisation’ 
of the war effort have taken precedence in the 
lead-up to the expected withdrawal of US and 
Western forces starting in 2012. By 2014, the 
US presence in Afghanistan will be restricted 
to mentoring and advising national troops, not 
combat, according to the plans implemented 
by US President Barack Obama in 2011. 
Repeating the past
Clearly, the US and NATO attempt to support 
a fledgling regime in Afghanistan bears similar 
hallmarks to the Soviet experience in Afghani-
stan, when an unpopular Afghan Communist 
regime held onto its de facto grip on power be-
tween 1978 and 1992. When the Soviet army 
withdrew the last of its forces on 15 February 
1989, most analysts predicted an imminent 
collapse of the weakening Communist regime 
led by Mohammad Najibullah. However, the 
acute lack of political and military cohesion 
among the various resistance fronts battling 
the Communist Afghan government under-
mined any serious effort towards the forma-
tion of an alternative to the widely disliked 
Najibullah regime. Moreover, the Soviet Union 
supplied the Afghan regime with billions of 
dollars’ worth of arms as the Soviets were with-
drawing, which helped to stem the tide of the 
mujahideen (various loosely aligned Afghan 
opposition groups), at least temporarily. 
Déjà vu
Twenty-two years after the withdrawal of the Soviets, Afghanistan is steeling itself for the exit of 
US troops by 2014. Thomas H Johnson explains how ethnic and political divides, coupled 
with weak institutions, provide seeds for a return to a heightened conflict after troops leave.
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US Marines carry a wounded Afghan civilian to a US army 
helicopter after he was wounded in a suicide attack in the 
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The current Afghan political situation re-
sembles the unpopular Najibullah regime in 
many ways: an often corrupt and mistrusted 
cabal of powerbrokers that is viewed as illegiti-
mate by parts of the country, a regime domi-
nated by foreign influence, and one whose au-
thority rarely penetrates into the countryside, 
where an estimated 80% of the population re-
sides. Like the Soviets, the US has announced 
that on top of the hundreds of billions of aid 
and support it has already spent in Afghani-
stan, over the next eight months Afghanistan 
will receive an additional USD2.7 billion in 
arms shipments that have been referred to as 
the “iron mountain” by NATO security ana-
lysts. This represents the largest transfer of 
military equipment by the US or NATO in the 
past eight years of conflict in Afghanistan.
In essence, the US effort in Afghanistan rep-
resents a paradox: propping up and reconsti-
tuting an increasingly unpopular regime, while 
attempting to militarily defeat a kaleidoscope 
of insurgent groups, a large portion of whom 
are local guerrillas radicalised by the perceived 
or actual abuses inflicted on 
them and their communities 
by the very regime the US 
is trying to support. To help 
mitigate this divide, US efforts 
to ‘Afghanise’ the war effort 
–by partnering with Afghan 
security personnel on both ki-
netic military operations and 
simple presence patrols and 
aid dispersal operations – are 
the cornerstone of the transition of security 
responsibilities from US/NATO forces to the 
Afghan government, and the prelude to with-
drawal. This mirrors the Soviet efforts in the 
late 1980s to withdraw its forces and attempt to 
turn the war over to the Afghan government. 
The success of US policies of ‘Afghanisa-
tion’ depends on the strength and effectiveness 
of the Afghan security forces and their abil-
ity to maintain regime continuity and stabil-
ity against a robust Afghan insurgency and 
jihad. Moreover, the Afghan National Army 
(ANA) faces a tremendous challenge in terms 
of soldier retention, as well as desertion. A 
2011 NATO study estimated that at least one 
in seven Afghan soldiers deserted during the 
first six months of 2011. Between January and 
June 2011, 24,590 soldiers deserted, compared 
to the same period in 2010, when 11,432 did 
so. In June alone, more than 5,000 soldiers de-
serted, nearly 3% of the 170,000 soldier force. 
While some may desert specifically to join 
the insurgency, a host of other reasons have 
driven these desertions, including financial is-
sues, fear of facing combat and ethnic tensions 
within the military. 
In addition to the retention problems faced 
by the ANA in fielding an adequate force, the 
ANA is also confronted by a wide variety of 
additional personnel problems, ranging from 
illiteracy, drug use and medical problems, to a 
tremendous dependency on foreign forces for 
mission effectiveness. The ANA’s inadequate 
combat capabilities and apparent lack of dedi-
cation are extremely significant problems. This 
was illustrated by the so-called Battle of Kam-
desh (Camp Keating) on 3 October 2009, near 
the town of Kamdesh, Nuristan. According to 
media reports, the ANA soldiers at Combat 
Outpost (COP) Keating quickly broke and ran 
or hid under blankets in the face of a Taliban 
attack so intense that the outpost was essen-
tially overrun, with eight US soldiers killed 
and 22 wounded. Although efforts have been 
made to improve training since this point, the 
ANA still remains over-dependent on the US 
and ISAF forces to provide guidance and mate-
rial support for security efforts. 
The US Office of the Special Inspector Gen-
eral for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), 
established by the US Congress to provide in-
dependent reporting and audits concerning 
US Afghanistan policy and missions, released 
a report in June 2010 that exposed significant 
issues concerning the ANA. Specifically, SI-
GAR found that “the measurements used in 
the assessment system [of the Afghanistan 
Nation Security Forces: ANSF] overstated the 
capabilities of the ANSF, particularly for top-
rated army and police units that did not always 
maintain the ability to conduct independent 
operations”. SIGAR’s claim was substantiated 
in August 2010, when 300 personnel from 
the First Brigade, 201st Army Corps, were 
sent into the village of Bad Pakh, in Laghman 
province, in an attack against the Taliban that 
was entirely unco-ordinated with US or NATO 
forces. Although touted as among the best 
units in the ANA, this unit suffered heavy cas-
ualties and required significant NATO assist-
ance for withdrawal. This event, the Battle of 
Kamdesh and many others ultimately raise the 
question as to whether or not the Afghans will 
be able maintain security and stability once US 
and international forces depart. 
Transition of security
On 15 July 2011, the US withdrew 650  soldiers 
from Parwan province, a strategic area just 
north of Kabul, marking the first of 10,000 
US troops expected to be withdrawn from Af-
ghanistan by the end of 2011. Another 13,000 
US troops will leave by the end of 2012, and 
the Afghan government will be solely respon-
sible for the country’s national security by 
2014. July 2011 also marked the completion of 
the first phase of the security transition from 
NATO to the ANSF. By late July, the Afghan 
government controlled security for the cit-
ies of Lashkar Gah in the south, Herat in the 
west, Mazar-e-Sharif in the north, Mihtarlam 
in the east, and the relatively stable provinces 
of Bamiyan, Panjshir and Kabul. 
Within two months, security incidents had 
steadily increased in Lashkar Gah, Bamiyan, 
Kabul, and Mihtarlam. Local engineers in 
Bamiyan were reported by media as saying 
that the surge in attacks had severely disrupted 
security for the Ashpusht mine by the first 
week of September; the mine is a key econom-
ic source for hundreds of local residents who 
work there. Other insurgent attacks left scores 
of Afghan police in Bamiyan 
dead or wounded since the 
security transfer, with the dis-
trict of Tala wa Barfak nearly 
succumbing to insurgent con-
trol. 
Like the Soviet Union, 
which eventually cut off essen-
tial aid and military supplies 
to the Afghan government in 
1991, the US is likely to sub-
stantially decrease its financial commitment to 
the Afghan government and its armed services 
after 2014, with some SIGAR estimates indi-
cating that less than USD3 billion will be al-
located in support of Afghan defence forces. 
However, in the meantime, the US is ramping 
up its financial and material support in prepa-
ration for the expected drawdown after 2012. 
Ultimately, the implications of a US and 
NATO withdrawal may be more damaging 
to Afghanistan in economic rather than stra-
tegic terms. According to the World Bank, 
97% of Afghanistan’s approximate USD28 bil-
lion gross domestic product (GDP) is directly 
related to foreign military and development 
aid and the in-country spending of foreign 
troops stationed in Afghanistan. Only one-
third of the Afghan government’s USD4.5 
billion budget comes from internal revenues. 
The economic dependence that Afghanistan 
has developed over the course of the war on 
foreign sources may be its major weakness. As 
yet, there appear to be no alternative sources 
of funding for the USD6 billion to USD8 bil-
lion per year required to maintain its planned 
379,000-man security force. 
Starting in September 2011, Afghanistan is 
‘Afghanistan remains deeply 
ethnically fragmented and 
this fragmentation presents 
significant challenges’
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set to receive what NATO war planners have 
termed the “iron mountain”, a nearly USD2.7 
billion allotment of advanced war material. 
The shipment will consist of 22,000 vehicles, 
44 aircraft and helicopters, 40,000 additional 
weapons, and tens of thousands of radios and 
other communications equipment. The weap-
ons shipment, which is expected to be com-
pleted by March 2012, represents the largest 
delivery of modern weaponry in recent Af-
ghan history. “In the next eight months, we are 
getting more equipment than we have got in 
the past eight years,” Ashraf Ghani, a top ad-
viser  in the Hamid Karzai administration and 
overseer of the security transition, told press in 
August 2011: “This time it is not all discarded 
equipment,” he added, “it is brand new.” 
Despite the increase in modern weaponry 
and equipment, deeply entrenched ethnic and 
political divides have hampered the growth 
and organisational capacity of the Afghan 
armed forces. These dynamics represent a 
long-term obstacle preventing Afghanistan 
from becoming a country able to defend itself 
from external threats or preventing a domestic 
political and security implosion. The Soviet-
Afghan conflict, and the ensuing civil war pe-
riod following the collapse of the Communist 
Afghan regime in 1992 helped polarise the 
conflict based partially on ethnic composition 
and by region, and by extension, along politi-
cal lines as well. The rise of the Taliban in 1994, 
and their consolidation of most of the country 
by 1996, prompted a forced unification among 
anti-Taliban military factions throughout most 
of the ethnically diverse northern provinces. 
These militia fronts and political factions 
collectively formed the United Islamic Front 
for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIF), com-
monly referred to as the Northern Alliance. 
Following the destruction of the Taliban re-
gime in November 2001, a cadre of UIF com-
manders and specifically those aligned with 
Shura-e Nazar, the military council formed by 
military leader Ahmad Shah Massoud in 1984, 
were given supremacy over the Afghan inter-
im administration. This initial level of influ-
ence would spill over into the formal creation 
of Afghan government ministries, including 
tremendous influence over the Ministry of De-
fence and its intelligence organs. Field Marshal 
Mohammed Qasim Fahim, Karzai’s first Min-
ister of Defence, promoted his Panjshiri Tajik 
allies into officer positions in the ANA, and 
later among the provincial governments in the 
north. Tajik dominance of the security struc-
ture became clear as 90 of the first 100 gener-
als appointed to the new army were from the 
Tajik-dominated Panjshir Valley, which, ac-
cording to the non-governmental organisation 
International Crisis Group in 2010, helped 
fan the flames of ethnic, regional and political 
factionalism within the armed forces. While 
more Pashtuns have joined the officer corps 
since Rahim Wardak, an ethnic Pashtun, be-
came Minister of Defence in December 2004, 
the Tajiks still have officer numbers that do not 
reflect national population demographics, at 
around 40% to 50% of total officers.
The US, NATO and Kabul have struggled to 
entice southern Pashtuns to join the ANSF. A 
study by the The New York Times in Septem-
ber 2011 showed that the number of southern 
Pashtuns in the Afghan National Army is mi-
nuscule, reflecting both fear of and sympathy 
for the insurgents among the southern Afghan 
population. According to The New York Times, 
the number of southern Pashtun Afghan army 
recruits declined by 30% between January and 
June, in comparison with the same period in 
2010. The predominantly Pashtun provinces of 
Kandahar, Helmand, Oruzgan, Zabul, Paktika 
and Ghazni that make up 17% of Afghani-
stan’s total population have only contributed 
1.5% of the recruits to the Afghan army since 
2009. This does not bode well for the stability 
or integrity of the Kabul government, serving 
Soldiers show their joy as the Soviet army leaves Afghanistan in February 1989, near the border of Soviet Uzbekistan, after a 10-year war. In the present situation, 
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instead to confirm suspicions of pro-Tajik bias 
on the part of the central administration.
The legacy of these ethnic and political di-
vides will not only have implications for or-
ganisational cohesion among Afghanistan’s 
national armed forces, but will also impact on 
the implementation of the national reconcilia-
tion and reintegration efforts launched by the 
Afghan government and financially supported 
by the international community. Ethnic frag-
mentation is also evidenced in and has tre-
mendous implications for the electoral politics 
of Afghanistan, where repeated elections have 
demonstrated that Afghan voters cast their 
ballots according to their ethno-linguistic af-
finities. 
Reconciliation and reintegration
Since 2008, the US and the Afghan govern-
ment have sporadically attempted to engage 
in talks with major insurgent factions includ-
ing the Taliban, the Haqqani Network and 
Hezb-i-Islami, regarding political settlements 
or de-escalation initiatives. Many of these pre-
conditional meetings have occurred in third 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, the Maldives, 
the United Arab Emirates and, according to 
international press reports, Germany during 
mid-2011. Publicly, the Afghan Taliban, led 
by Mullah Mohammad Omar, have denied 
engaging in any such dialogue with the West. 
However, the release of a message purport-
edly issued by Mullah Omar to mark the end 
of Ramadan in September 2011 implied that 
some discussion about prisoner exchanges was 
taking place, although not dialogue for a peace 
process.
Other groups, such as the Haqqani Network, 
have issued only the occasional denial of en-
gaging in political discussions, although some 
Pakistani intelligence personnel have indicated 
publicly that they are willing to represent the 
Haqqani faction in talks with the Afghan gov-
ernment. The Hezb-i-Islami faction, led by the 
warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, represents the 
most responsive group to pre-negotiations so 
far, with official representatives holding offices 
in Europe (Norway) and even the US. 
Although various demobilisation, disarma-
ment and reconciliation programmes have 
been active in Afghanistan since May 2003, 
the Peace Through Strength (PTS), or Takhim-
e-Sohl, reintegration initiative established in 
May 2005 initially emerged as the most prom-
ising, although it quickly became hampered by 
the usual accusations of mismanagement, lack 
of resources, corruption and failed promises. 
The London conference held in January 2009 
sought to mitigate these shortfalls by earmark-
ing an estimated USD141 million to help re-
invigorate the faltering PTS programme by 
folding it and smaller initiatives into a more 
streamlined and better funded Afghan Nation-
al Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP). 
Since the influx of financial resources, NATO 
had registered nearly 1,700 former fighters as 
of July 2011, including a few senior Taliban 
commanders such as Maulavi Azizullah Agha 
from Kandahar. The Afghan government, ac-
cording to NATO, is in talks with between 40 
and 50 locally armed groups that represent a 
further 2,000 fighters seeking to reintegrate. 
NATO’s initiatives seek to mimic a similar 
national reconciliation programme launched 
by the Communist Najibullah regime in 1987. 
Although the national resistance facing the 
Communist regime during the Soviet occupa-
tion was far greater, Najibullah expressed his 
confidence in a meeting held in April 1988 that 
out of the 270,000 ‘counter-revolutionaries’ 
threatening the state, around one-third were 
communicating with the government, around 
50,000 were deemed irreconcilables, and the 
remaining rebels maintained a ‘wait-and-see’ 
position. By contrast, the two reconciliation 
programmes hosted by the contemporary 
Karzai regime have probably reconciled fewer 
than 5,000 potential insurgents and criminals.
Afghanistan’s diverse society and traditional 
ethnic and tribal rivalries will continue to 
complicate the efforts to reintegrate insurgents 
and divide public support for such efforts, 
despite the creation of a High Peace Council 
tasked with overseeing and directing over-
tures to insurgent fronts. The fragmentation of 
many Afghan communities and deep histori-
cal and political grievances has proven prob-
lematic in the past and these patterns appear 
set to continue, with the relatively low level of 
uptake for the reconciliation programmes il-
lustrating these problems. 
Yet at the same time, the ongoing strength of 
the Taliban and its apparent ability to maintain 
recruitment levels has resulted in the emer-
gence of groups, often from ethnic minorities, 
designed to fight against a Taliban empowered 
either by a security vacuum following the US 
withdrawal or an increase in political legiti-
macy from negotiations. For instance, media 
reports of former UIF commanders and ethnic 
Hazara fronts rearming themselves are preva-
lent since overtures to the Taliban first surfaced 
in 2009. Despite the UN’s efforts to disarm il-
legally formed groups during the first part of 
the past decade, when 94,262 small-arms and 
12,248 heavy weapons were collected, fewer 
than half these armaments were destroyed; 
many went to the reconstituted army and po-
lice forces where the management and docu-
mentation of these arms was non-existent. 
The ability for non-state actors to arm them-
selves in Afghanistan is astoundingly robust, 
and criminal smuggling networks that excel 
at weapons and explosives trafficking remain 
active throughout all of Afghanistan, giving 
credence to fears that any future civil conflict 
in Afghanistan could easily echo the dark 
period of Afghanistan’s civil war in the early 
1990s that killed an estimated 55,000 Afghans 
in Kabul alone. One of the most influential op-
position blocs to negotiate with the Taliban is 
led by Amarullah Saleh, the former Afghan 
National Directorate for Security intelligence 
chief,  who said in an August 2011 interview 
with CNN that if the Taliban were permitted 
to return as a “Hizbullah-like entity,” then he 
Afghan men protest against the United States in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, in March. The success of US 
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and his anti-Taliban constituency must “rise 
up” against them (the government and the 
Taliban).
Future trends
Following the withdrawal of US and interna-
tional forces from Afghanistan, beginning in 
2012 and continuing steadily towards 2014, 
Afghan political and security conditions will 
remain vulnerable to the litany of threats and 
challenges currently plaguing the country. De-
spite ongoing reconciliation and negotiation 
efforts, these are likely to make an appreciable 
impact on the security situation. The Taliban 
and other Afghan insurgents may view the an-
nounced withdrawal of international forces by 
2014 as an opportunity to step up their attacks 
and prepare to expand their presence post-
2014. With the prospect of a vastly reduced 
security presence from 2014, there is little in-
centive for the insurgents to engage in genuine 
negotiation. 
Acute divisions arising from the past decade 
of power grabs, corruption and graft, as well 
as the engrained nepotism and cronyism based 
on a complex relationship of tribal affiliation, 
ethnicity, ideology and factional loyalties, has 
already deeply divided any remaining thread 
of Afghanistan’s social cohesion. The experi-
ments by international forces with locally 
based defence militias could either serve as a 
bulwark against increased insurgent attacks 
or, more likely, encourage a deterioration into 
renewed social conflict in an environment 
of weakening state control. A weak national 
armed services infrastructure, which will be 
fully responsible for Afghanistan’s national 
security in 2014, is likely to crumble amid an 
emboldened union of insurgent forces sup-
ported by regional powers such as Pakistan 
and Iran. Mass desertions from the Afghan 
army and polarised ethnic-based militias will 
compound the problem, further fragmenting 
the country.
In short, US and international withdrawal 
could serve as the catalyst for the multitude 
of anti-government forces to come into con-
flict with each other, while continuing to re-
sist the Afghan state following the loss of a 
unifying enemy: foreign forces. Propelled by 
clandestine armed support from neighbour-
ing sponsors, the Arab Gulf and transnational 
organised crime syndicates, the fragmented 
factions could rapidly undermine what stabil-
ity has been achieved during the past 10 years. 
Despite a veneer of stability in some, mainly 
urban areas, many of the dynamics that under-
pinned the conflicts of the past 40 years remain 
strongly entrenched. As such, the withdrawal 
of international forces in 2014 could herald a 
return to the broad-ranging type of civil con-
flict that took hold in Afghanistan as the post-
Soviet Najibullah regime came under increas-
ing pressure. 
Despite the international withdrawal, there 
is unlikely to be the same kind of financial 
and military abandonment of the country that 
took place following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. The US and other international 
actors will remain engaged, albeit at a much 
lower level than between 2001 and 2014, and 
signs of a major deterioration in the security 
situation would spark international concern. 
This could potentially spark a boost in fund-
ing, training and advisory initiatives, although 
any thought of returning international troops 
to Afghanistan would be highly politically sen-
sitive.
Conclusion
Even after 10 years, the conflict in Afghanistan 
is by no means over. On the contrary, deep-
rooted ethnic and political divides, coupled 
with still weak political and security institu-
tions, hold all the seeds for a return to the 
heightened conflict that characterised much of 
the decade before 2001. 
The level of social and political fragmenta-
tion in Afghanistan initially assisted the US-
led military coalition’s efforts in dismantling 
the Taliban regime and its many franchised 
components, but has since proved to be a sub-
stantial obstacle in rebuilding and restructur-
ing a functioning national army. As yet, there 
do not appear to be sustained efforts to reverse 
this trend and counter negative perceptions of 
the security forces, creating the potential for a 
fragmentation of the notionally unified struc-
ture into potentially combative factions. 
Afghanistan remains deeply ethnically 
fragmented and this fragmentation presents 
significant challenges for the development of 
cohesive and legitimate governmental institu-
tions. Over the past 100 years, national politics 
have not been of much concern to the ordi-
nary Afghan, who made decreasing the state’s 
influence at a local level the major priority. 
As such, there is little entrenched confidence 
in the necessity for or durability of a central-
ised Kabul government. This will undermine 
ongoing efforts to forge a unified country and 
continue to strengthen locally based insurgent 
groups. Given these factors, the post-2014 
 environment is likely to see a drift away from 
the more centralised approach, bringing with 
it the possibility of renewed conflict and politi-
cal unrest. n
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US President Barack Obama, left, and Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai, right, walk off stage 
 following their joint news conference in the East Room of the White House in Washington in 2010.
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